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1.  Introduction 
 
Fox and Hackl (2006) noticed the following contrasts: 
 
(1) a.  Jack only has to read more than [three]F books 
 b.  # Jack is only allowed to read more than [three]F books 
 c.  # Jack only read more than [three]F books 
 
 They show that the acceptability of a sentence of the form 
[….only…..dF…..], where d is a focused degree-denoting expression, correlates 
with the availability of a scalar implicature for the very same sentence without 
only: for instance, Jack has to read more than three books by Balzac generally 
implicates that Jack does not have to read more than four books by Balzac, while 
Jack read more than three books by Balzac does not generally implicate that Jack 
did not read more than four books by Balzac (i.e. does not implicate that Jack read 
exactly four books). Fox and Hackl (2006) furthermore show that these contrasts 
(as well as many other facts) follow from the following assumptions: 
 
" The focus value of a degree-denoting expression is the set of all degrees 
belonging to the same dimension. 
" In every dimension, the set of degrees is dense, i.e. given two degrees d1 
and d2, there is always a degree d3 that is strictly ‘between’ d1 and d2 
relatively to the relevant ordering relation.  
" Implicatures are derived by means of a focus-sensitive operator whose 
semantics is essentially the one proposed for only in Krifka (1993). In case 
this operator yields the contradictory proposition, no implicature can arise, 
and inserting only yields an ungrammatical sentence. 
 
                                                 
!I am extremely grateful to Danny Fox. The discussions I had with him contributed a lot to this 
paper. I also thank Jeroen Groenendijk and an anonymous reviewer for an interesting suggestion 
that I could not fully take into account in this paper. Many thanks also to Ivona Kucerova for 
sharing with me relevant data from Czech. I benefited from various comments from the audience 
of the MIT question reading group (Fall 2006), and the ‘Journées Sémantique et Modélisation’ 
(March 2007, Paris). I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 
Paris (Dpt d’Etudes Cognitives, of which I am an associate member) and of the MIT-France Seed 
Fund Grant for Collaborative Research on Presuppositions and Implicatures (2006-2007). 
                                               © 2007 by Benjamin Spector 
T. Friedman and M. Gibson (eds), SALT XVII 282-299, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
  In this paper, I am not going to challenge Fox and Hackl’s account. Rather 
I will show that modified numerals follow exactly the pattern they have identified 
even when the focused element is not the numeral itself, but the entire DP that 
contains the numeral. In this case the nature of “measurement scales” is simply 
irrelevant, and a separate account is anyway called for. Thus consider the 
following question-answer pairs: 
 
(2) a. What books does Jack have to read in order to pass the exam? 
         b. Jack has to read [more than three novels by Balzac]F 
(3) a. What books is Jack allowed to read ? 
 b. Jack is allowed to read [more than three novels by Balzac]F 
(4) a. What books did Jack read ? 
 b. Jack read [more than three novels by Balzac]F 
 
 While (2b) implicates that Jack does not have to read more than four 
novels by Balzac (and, in fact, that he has no reading obligation apart from 
reading more than three novels by Balzac), no similar inference is available for 
(3b) and (4b). In other words, Fox and Hackl’s (2006) facts are entirely preserved 
in all these cases. But their account cannot be easily extended, because the 
alternatives (i.e. the focus values) of (2b), (3b), and (4b) include more than just 
what would result from replacing the numeral with an other numeral. The focus 
value of an increasing generalized quantifier, indeed, is usually assumed to be the 
set of all (relevant) increasing generalized quantifiers (in fact, this is clearly 
needed if one wants to account for the fact that 2b, for instance, also implicates 
that Jack does not have to read, say, any novels by Flaubert). To put things 
differently, the set of propositions denoted by the underlying question (2a) 
(respectively, 3a and 4a), includes more than just those that can be expressed by 
sentences of the form [Jack has to <resp. is allowed to, #> read more than n 
books by Balzac] – this set is in fact the denotation of a how many-question. 
  In this paper, I will offer an account of these contrasts (together with other 
facts) based on the following intuitions: 
 
" The pragmatic meaning of a sentence S with alternatives Alt(S) is the 
exhaustive interpretation of S when given as an answer to a question 
whose denotation is Alt(S).  
" Interpreting an answer as exhaustive means the same as assuming that the 
answer IS the complete answer to the question. 
" (2b) is, in some contexts, the actual complete answer to (2a): namely, (2b) 
is the actual complete answer in any world in which Jack has to read more 
than three novels by Balzac and has no other reading obligation. On the 
other hand, (3b) cannot be the complete answer to (3a), and (4b) cannot be 
the complete answer to (4a). 
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 I will first show that the interpretation of wh-questions containing a modal 
operator motivates a revision of standard assumptions. Then I will offer a theory 
of exhaustive interpretations. These two separate proposals, when combined, will 
be able to account for the above contrasts. It will turn out that the whole account 
is entirely consistent with the general perspective outlined by Fox (2007b). 
 
 
2.  An Unnoticed Reading for Wh-Questions: Wh-Phrases as Higher-Order 
Quantifiers
 
Consider the following question: 
(5) Which books does Jack have to read? 
 
According to Karttunen’s (1977) – henceforth K.- semantics for questions, 
the complete answer to (5), in a given world w, is the proposition expressed by 
the conjunction of all the statements of the form ‘Jack must read x’, with x a 
book, that are true in w, if there are such true statements; if, in w, there is no book 
x such that Jack must read x, then the complete answer is the proposition that 
states that there are no particular books that Jack must read. According to 
Groenendijk & Stockhof’s (1984) – henceforth G&S- partition semantics, the 
complete answer to (5) is the proposition that states what the extension of the 
predicate !x.(x is a book and Jack has to read x) is in w1. Consider now the 
following situation: there are books on a table, call them A, B, C, etc. Jack’s 
actual reading obligations are as follows: he has to either read A and B, or C and 
D, and he has no other reading obligations. It follows that there is no particular 
book x such that Jack must read x. As a result, both K. and G&S. predict that the 
complete answer in this case is the proposition expressed by there are no books 
that Jack must read. Yet it seems that a cooperative speaker who knows what 
Jack’s reading obligations are is likely to provide the answerer with the 
information that Jack must either read A and B, or C and D. But this proposition 
is not even predicted to be a partial answer by K. and G&S, as its truth has no 
implication whatsoever regarding the extension of !x.(x is a book & Jack has to 
read x). This observation suggests that the semantics of wh-questions should be 
amended, so that the proposition that Jack has to either read A and B or C and D 
counts as the complete answer in such a situation. 
For sure, one could claim that our observation actually boils down to the 
fact that speakers, when answering a question, often choose to address another 
question which they believe the questioner is interested in; in the above case, the 
                                                 
1In both systems, as well as in subsequent works, which-phrases are treated as binding an e-
type variable, unless we are dealing with pair-list or functional readings (Engdahl 1986, Chierchia 
1991, Sharvit 1999).  
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answerer may assume that the questioner is interested in whatever reading 
obligation Jack has, and choose to give an answer to What are Jack’s reading 
obligations? In the next sub-sections, I’ll give several arguments that such a 
pragmatic account is not sufficient. These arguments are based on the 
interpretation of embedded wh-questions and of elided answers to wh-questions. 
 
2.1.  Embedded Modalized Wh-Questions 
 
Consider the following scenario: Jack must read books A and B and he also has to 
read a third book, which can be either book C or book D; he has no other reading 
obligation. In other words, his reading obligations are exactly as follows: read A 
and B and (C or D). Mary knows that Jack must read A and B, and that there is no 
other particular book that Jack must read, but she does not know that Jack has to 
either read C or D. In such a situation, Mary knows what the extension of !x.(x is 
a book that Jack has to read) is. Hence, according to both K. and G & S, she 
happens to be in the relation denoted by know to the complete answer to Which 
books does Jack have to read?  Following Karttunen (1977), G & S (1984), Heim 
(1994), Lahiri (2002), let us assume that a sentence of the form Mary knows Q, 
where Q is an interrogative clause, is true in  a world w if and only if Mary is, in 
w, in the relation denoted by know to the proposition that is the complete answer 
to Q in w. Then, in this scenario, the following sentence is predicted to be true2: 
 
(6) Mary knows which books Jack has to read 
 
 Yet there is clearly a reading under which (6) is false in the above 
scenario3. Indeed, one could easily object to (6) as follows: 
 
(7) No! Mary does not know that Jack has to read book C or book D. 
 
 This shows that there is a reading under which (6), in such a situation, 
entails that Mary knows that Jack must read A and B, and that he must read C 
or D. If we maintain the standard view that Mary knows Q is true iff Mary is in 
the relation denoted by know to the actual complete answer to Q, then the 
complete answer to Which books does Jack have to read? has to entail, in the 
above scenario, Jack has to read books A and B and either book C or book D. 
This requires a revision of the semantics of wh-questions4.  
                                                 
2Both under the ‘strongly exhaustive’ reading and the ‘weakly exhaustive’ reading. 
3There is also a reading of (6) under which (6) is true, though this reading is not the most 
natural one. Thus it is possible to give the following reply to (7): “What I meant is that Mary 
knows which particular books Jack definitely has to read”.   
4Of course, one can question K’s and G & S’s assumption regarding the interpretation of 
embedded questions, and argue that X  knows Q (with Q a question) is true if X knows the truth of 
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 Here is an informal presentation of such a possible revision. Let us assume 
that wh-questions are systematically ambiguous between two types of reading, 
which, in the case of (5), can be paraphrased as follows: 
 
(8) a. For which books x, is it the case that Jack has to read x? 
            b. For which generalized quantifier G over books, Jack has to read G5? 
 
 On the b-reading, the complete answer to (5) is the strongest true 
proposition of the form Jack has to read G, with G a generalized quantifier over 
books. In the above scenario, the complete answer so defined is the proposition 
expressed by Jack has to read books A and B and either book C or book D. From 
now on, I will call this reading the higher-order reading of wh-questions. The 
other reading, paraphrased in (8a), I call the individual reading of wh-questions. 
 
2.2.  Elided Quantified Answers and Weak Island Effects 
 
Consider the following question-answer pairs: 
 
(9) a. Which books must we read? 
 b. The French novels or the Russian novels 
(10) a. Which books did Jack demand that we read? 
 b. The French novels or the Russian novels 
(11) a. Which books did you expect Mary to read? 
 b. The French novels or the Russian novels 
 
 In each of the above examples, the elided answer can be interpreted either 
in the position of the wh-gap, or as taking wide scope. That is, (9b), (10b) and 
(11b) give rise to the following ambiguities, respectively: 
 
(12) a. We must either read the French novels or the Russian ones - it’s up to 
us which ones 
 b. Either we must read the French novels, or we must read the Russian 
ones novels (I don’t remember which) 
(13) a. Jack demanded that we either read the French novels or the Russian 
ones – it’s up to us which ones 
 b. Either Jack demanded that we read the French novels, or he demanded 
that we read the Russian ones (I don’t know) 
                                                                                                                                     
a proposition S that is a maximally relevant answer to Q in a broad sense. See Ginzburg (1995a, 
1995b), and van Rooij (2003) for proposals along this line. 
5A generalized quantifier G is said to be (or range) ‘over P’, where P is a set of individuals, iff 
P is the smallest live-on set of G (see Szabolcsi 1997). The smallest live-on set of a GQ G is the 
smallest set A such that : $Y (Y% G ! (Y&A) % G). 
Fact: For any conservative Det, the smallest live-on set of [[Det NP]] is [[NP]] 
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(14) a. I expect Mary to either read the French novels or the Russian ones 
 b.  Either I expect Mary to read the French novels, or I expect her to read 
the Russian ones  <odd: suggests that I don’t know what I expect> 
 
 It turns out that the narrow-scope reading is subject to interesting 
grammatical constraints. In all of the following examples, the answer is not 
ambiguous, and can only receive a wide-scope interpretation: 
 
(15) a. Which books didn’t Jack read? 
 b. The French novels or the Russian novels 
  ' Unavailable reading: it is not the case that Jack either read the 
French novels or the Russian novels = Jack read neither the Russian 
nor the French novels 
 ' Available reading: Jack didn’t read the French novels, or he didn’t 
read the Russian novels 
(16) a. ? Which books did Mary ask whether Jack read? 
  b. The French novels or the Russian novels 
 ' Unavailable: Mary asked whether Jack either read the French 
novels or the Russian novels 
 ' Available: Either Mary asked whether Jack read the French novels, 
or she asked whether he read the Russian ones 
(17) a. Which books did Mary discover that Jack read ? 
 b. The French novels or the Russian novels 
        ' Unavailable: Mary discovered that Jack either read the French 
novels or the Russian novels (could be true in a situation in which Jack 
read the French novels but not the Russian ones and Mary discovered 
that Jack read either the French novels or the Russian ones without 
knowing that he in fact read the French ones) 
   ' Available: Either Mary discovered that Jack read the French novels, 
or she discovered that he read the Russian ones (presupposes that Jack 
actually read both the French novels and the Russian novels) 
 
 It appears that negation, embedded interrogatives and factive verbs block 
the ‘narrow-scope’ reading of elided answers. This typology is familiar: namely, 
the narrow-scope reading of elided answers is blocked in weak-islands 
environment. Why could this be so? It is natural to assume that the ‘narrow-
scope’ reading of elided answers arises when the underlying question is itself 
interpreted under its ‘higher-order’ reading. Note indeed that under the 
‘individual’ reading, the narrow-scope reading of an elided answer would not 
even count as a partial answer6. Hence we are led to assume that the higher-order 
reading of wh-questions is itself subject to weak-islands, which would explain 
why the narrow-scope reading of elided answers in unavailable in weak-island 
environments7. If this is so, embedded wh-questions that contain a weak-island 
are expected not to license the higher-order reading, a prediction that we now put 
to test in the case of factive islands. Consider the following dialogues: 
 
(18) a. Sue knows which books Mary demanded that Jack read 
 b.  No! Sue knows that Mary demanded that Jack read the Italian novels, 
but she does not know that Mary furthermore demanded that Jack either 
read the French novels or the Russian novels (though she did not have 
more precise demands) 
(19) a. Sue knows which books Mary discovered that Jack read 
 b. # No! Sue knows that Mary discovered that Jack read the Italian 
novels, but she does not know that Mary furthermore discovered that Jack 
either read the French novels or the Russian novels (though she does not 
know which ones) 
 
  The naturalness of (18b) is predicted only if the higher-order reading is 
licensed for which books Mary demanded that Jack read: indeed, the fact that Sue 
does not know that Mary demanded that Jack read the French novels or the 
Russian novels does not entail that Sue does not know the extension of !x.(x is a 
book that Mary demanded that Jack read), hence does not justify an objection to 
(18a) if which books Mary demanded that Jack read is interpreted under its 
‘individual’ reading. On the other hand, the truth of (18b) entails that Sue does 
not know the truth of the most informative true sentence of the form Mary 
demanded that Jack read G, with G a GQ over books, i.e. does not know the 
complete answer to which books Mary demanded that Jack read under the higher-
order interpretation. By a parallel reasoning, the infelicity of (19b) leads us to 
conclude that the higher-order reading is unavailable for which books Mary 
discovered that Jack read: if such a reading were available, then (19b) should 
count as a felicitous reply, given that it indeed entails that Sue is not in the 
relation know to the strongest true proposition of the form Mary discovered that 
                                                 
6Except in some particular cases, such as (15a): any answer of the form Jack didn’t read G, 
with G a GQ over books, can be reformulated as a boolean combination of sentences of the form 
Jack didn’t read x, with x being an individual book. 
7In my SALT talk, I showed that the higher-order reading is sensitive to weak-islands in a way 
that is fully parallel to the pattern discovered by Fox and Hackl (2006) for degree questions: 
namely, negative islands can be obviated if negation scopes over a possibility modal. Thus, in the 
following question-answer pair, the answer can be interpreted as taking scope below allowed: 
- What books are we not allowed to read ? The Russian novels or the French novels 
Possible interpretation: ‘We are neither allowed to read the Russian novels nor the French 
ones’ 
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Jack read G, with G a GQ over books. It therefore appears that the higher-order 
reading of embedded wh-questions is subject to factive islands. 
 The fact that this “higher-order” reading is sensitive to such grammatical 
constraints strongly suggests that it corresponds to a genuinely distinct reading of 
wh-questions (and is not simply a pragmatic effect). 
 
 2.3.  Proposal 
 
If these arguments are conclusive, we need to posit that questions such as (5) are 
truly ambiguous between two readings. As suggested above, these two readings 
can be informally paraphrased as follows: 
 
(20) a. For which books x, is it the case that Jack must read x? 
            b.  For which generalized quantifier G over books, Jack must read G? 
 
 In fact, it is necessary to impose an additional restriction on the variable 
G. G should range over increasing GQs over books. The motivation for this 
restriction is the following. Suppose that Jack has to read at least two novels by 
Balzac, and is furthermore not allowed to read any novel by Nabokov, and that 
these are his only obligations. Then the strongest true statement of the form Jack 
has to read G, with G a GQ over books, is Jack must read at least two novels by 
Balzac and no novel by Nabokov. In the absence of any particular restriction, it is 
thus predicted that the sentence Sue knows what books Jack must read is true in 
this situation only if Sue knows that Jack must read at least two novels by Balzac 
and no novel by Nabokov. However, it seems that the sentence in question is true 
as soon as Sue knows that Jack must read at least two novels by Balzac. This fact 
is readily explained if we replace (20b) with the following: 
 
(21) For which increasing generalized quantifier G over books, is it the case 
that Jack must read G? 
 
Let me offer a more formal rendering of this proposal. One possible 
implementation is to treat wh-phrases as ambiguous, as shown below (as in K. the 
denotation of a question is taken to be a set of propositions)8: 
                                                 
8Two remarks are in order:  i) Instead of locating the ambiguity in the wh-phrase itself, it is 
certainly possible to treat it as a syntactic ambiguity. The “higher-order” reading could plausibly 
be derived by syntactic reconstruction. If this were so, we would expect certain correlations 
between condition C of Binding Theory and the presence or absence of the higher-order reading 
(see Fox 1999 for examples involving a similar ambiguity in how-many questions). Kucerova 
(2007) provides preliminary evidence from Czech for a syntactic account of the ambiguity: Czech 
split wh-questions, which are constrained by weak-islands, can only be interpreted under the 
higher-order reading. ii) (22) might need to be modified so that the variable G, instead of ranging 
over generalized quantifiers, ranges over intensional counterparts of generalized quantifiers (i.e. 
functions from worlds to GQs, type <s, <<e,t>,t>>). Such a modification would be hard to 
Modalized Questions and Exhaustivity 289
(22) a. [[ (What NP)i S]](w) = !"<s,t>."(w) = 1 & (x<e> (x % [[ NP]] & [[ S]] i'x = ") 
 b. [[ (What NP)G S]](w) = !"<s,t>."(w) = 1 & (X<<e,t>,t> (X is increasing and 
its smallest live-on set belongs to [[ NP]]  & [[ S]] G'X = ") 
 
(22a) is basically identical to K.’s proposal: the denotation of Which books 
must Jack read? is, given (22a), the set of all the true propositions of the form 
‘Jack must read x’, with x standing for a (possibly plural) individual made up of 
books. According to (22b), the denotation of the very same question is the set of 
all the true propositions of the form ‘Jack must read G’, with G an increasing GQ 
ranging over books. Our observations regarding the weak-island sensitivity of the 
low-reading are then reducible to the claim that wh-phrases of the type of (22b) 
cannot be moved across weak islands – I do not provide an account of this fact. 
I now turn to the analysis of exhaustive interpretation. The next section is, 
as such, entirely independent of the second one. 
 
 
3.  A Simple Theory of Exhaustive Interpretations 
 
3.1. Exhaustive Interpretations: Assuming That an Answer Is Complete 
 
For any given question Q and world w, I define the complete answer to Q in w as 
the logically strongest member of the denotation of Q. Let Q be Which books did 
you read? and w be such that I read books A and B and no other book in w. 
Under its individual reading, Q denotes in w the set of all propositions of the form 
I read x, with x a book or a plurality of books that I read in w9.   
So we have: Qindividual-reading(w) = {the proposition that I read A, the 
proposition that I read B, the proposition that I read A and B}. Hence the 
complete answer in this case is the proposition that I read A and B, as Karttunen 
would have had it10.  
On the higher-order reading, the denotation of Q in w is the following set: 
Qhigher-order reading(w) = {that I read A, that I read B, that I read A or B, that I read A 
and B}. Hence the complete answer in this case is the same as before, namely, the 
                                                                                                                                     
distinguish, I believe, from an alternative proposal that was suggested to me by Jeroen 
Groenendijk and an anonymous reviewer: the higher-order reading would not involve 
quantification over GQs, but quantification over properties (i.e. functions from worlds to sets of 
individuals). According to this alternative account, the right paraphrase for the higher-order 
reading would be “For what property P, is it true that Jack has to read an individual X made up of 
novels and having property P”. Such a property could be, for instance, that of being the books A 
and B or the books C and D. I intend to investigate this alternative analysis in future work. 
9In the whole paper, it is assumed that the domain of individuals is a joint semi-lattice 
structured by a part-whole relation, consisting of both of atomic individuals (the minimal 
members of the domain, which have no proper part) and of plural individuals (also called 
‘pluralities’) made up of atomic individuals, as is standard in many works concerned with the 
semantics of plural expressions. 
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proposition that I read A and B. Basically, in all the cases that I am going to 
consider in this question, the individual-reading and the higher-order reading give 
rise to the same notion of complete answer – this will be so as long as no operator 
intervenes between the wh-phrase and the gap.  
 Consider now the following dialogue: 
 
(23) a. Which novels did Mary read? 
 b. Mary read Ulysses and Madame Bovary 
 
 Suppose that, by default, it is assumed that the answer given to a question 
is the actual complete answer to the question. Then (23b) will be interpreted as: 
‘That Mary read Ulysses and Madame Bovary is the complete  answer to Which 
novels did Mary read?”. This is in fact equivalent to: “Mary read Ulysses and 
Madame Bovary and did not read any other novel”. So here is a mechanism that 
generates the exhaustive interpretation in simple cases. This procedure actually 
mirrors Krifka’s (1993) semantics for only, according to which only S asserts that 
S is the logically strongest true proposition within its alternatives. Let us 
introduce an operator OpQ which, when applied to a proposition S, returns the 
proposition that states that S is the complete answer to Q: 
 
(24) a. [[OpQ S]] (w) = 1 if S is the strongest member of Q(w) 
 b. [[OpQ]]  =)*.)w.(* % Q(w) + $, ((,%Q(w)) ' (* -  ,))) 
   
3.2. The Limitations of OpQ 
 
As has been noticed by van Rooij & Schulz (2006) among others (and anticipated 
by Groenendijk & Stockhof 1984), Op fails to give rise to the right result as soon 
as it applies to a disjunctive or indefinite answer. Let me illustrate this fact in the 
case of a disjunctive answer: 
 
(25) a. Which novels did Mary read? 
            b. Mary read Ulysses or Madame Bovary 
 
 Applied to (25b), Op(25a) returns the following proposition: 
 
(26) The proposition that Mary read Ulysses or Madame Bovary is the 
complete answer to Which novels did Mary read? 
 
 It turns out that (26) is contradictory. Indeed, any world w has one of the 
following properties: a) Mary read neither Ulysses nor Madame Bovary in w, b) 
                                                                                                                                     
10It is in principle possible that denotation of a question Q in w is such that none of its 
members entails all the others, in which case there is no complete answer to Q in w. 
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Mary read Ulysses but did not read Madame Bovary in w, c) Mary read Madame 
Bovary but did not read Ulysses in w, and d) Mary read both Ulysses and Madame 
Bovary in w. In the a) case, (25b) is false and therefore cannot be the complete 
answer, so (26) is false. In the b) case, the complete answer to (25a) is the 
proposition that states that Mary read Ulysses, hence (25b) is true but is not the 
complete answer, and therefore (26) is false. By symmetry, (26) is false also in 
the c) case. And in the d) case, the complete answer to (25a) is the proposition 
that Mary read both novels, so (25b) is true but is not the complete answer, and 
therefore (26) is false.   
 So a theory of exhaustivity based on OpQ predicts that the exhaustive 
interpretation of a disjunctive answer is the contradictory proposition; this 
amounts to saying that a disjunctive answer does not undergo any kind of 
strengthening (since no sensible speaker would assume that the intended meaning 
of an answer is the contradictory proposition, it will simply be assumed that OpQ 
is absent). This of course conflicts with well-known observations: namely, an 
answer such as (25b) tends to be interpreted as conveying that Mary read only one 
of the two novels Ulysses and Madame Bovary and did not read any other novel. 
 In order to solve this problem, van Rooij & Schulz (2004, 2006)11 defends 
(and improves on) the original proposal of Gronendijk & Stockhof (1984), and 
define an exhaustivity operator which, when applied to a disjunctive answer, 
yields the desired result. In the rest of this section, I am going to follow a different 
route: namely, I’ll show that a theory of exhaustivity based on OpQ can be 
maintained provided we allow OpQ to be inserted under the scope of some 
operators instead of being forced to apply to the answer as a whole.  It will be  
shown that such a theory is able to predict that modified numerals and bare 
numerals give rise to different implicatures in simple contexts12. 
 
3.3.  A Syntactic Trick13 
 
Let us go back to the problematic case that involved a disjunction: 
 
(27) a. Which novels did Mary read? 
            b. Mary read [Ulysses or Madame Bovary]f  
 
 Let us now assume that (27) can be interpreted as corresponding to the 
following logical form: 
                                                 
11See also Spector (2003, 2006) 
12That is, (A) Jack read more than two novels does not implicate that Jack read exactly three 
novels, as oppposed to (B) Jack read three novels. Yet we take A and B to express the same 
proposition. But see fn. 15. 
13The proposal presented in this section has been independently suggested by Ezra Keshet 
(2006). I first developed it in my dissertation (Spector 2006: appendix 2, chapter 2: 214-236). 
Keshet credits Kratzer (2005) for a similar idea. 
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(28) [Ulysses or Madame Bovary]. [)x.(Op(27)a(Mary read x))] 
 
 Now what is the denotation of )x.(Op(27a) (Mary read x))? Recall that 
Op(27a) (Mary read x) stands for “the proposition that Mary read x is the complete 
answer to Which novels did Mary read?”. Therefore )x.(Op(27a) (Mary read x)))  
denotes the set of individuals d such that the proposition that Mary read d is the 
complete answer to Which novels did Mary read? In other words, it is the set of 
individuals d such that d is the maximal plurality of novels read by Mary. This set 
is a singleton set whose only member is the plural entity made up of all the novels 
that Mary read: 
 
(29) [[)x.(Op(27)(Mary read x))]] (w) = )x.(x= the novels that Mary read in w) 
 
  Following a standard treatment of disjunction, ‘Ulysses or Madame 
Bovary’ denotes the following generalized quantifier: 
 
(30) [[Ulysses or Madame Bovary]]   = )P<e,t> .(P(Ulysses) = 1 orincl P(Madame 
Bovary) = 1)  
 
 So in general an expression of the form ‘Ulysses or Madame Bovary P’ is 
true if and only if one of the two novels has the property denoted by P, including 
the case where both novels have this property. But it is a logical fact that two 
distinct individuals A and B cannot both have the property denoted by )x.(x= the 
novels that Mary read), since this property always denote the singleton set whose 
only member is the individual made up of all the novels that Mary read. Since 
(28) says that the property of being all the novels that Mary read applies to 
Ulysses or to Madame Bovary, it means that Mary read either Ulysses and no 
other novel, or Madame Bovary and no other novel. So by allowing Op to be 
inserted under the scope of the disjunctive phrase, one can in fact derive the 
desired reading. A theory of scalar implicatures and exhaustive readings based on 
OpQ can therefore be entertained, provided it includes the option of inserting OpQ  
under the scope of some other expressions14. The next sections show that such a 
theory is able to account for the interpretation of bare and modified numerals in 
various contexts. 
 
3.4.  Bare and Modified Numerals 
 
The following two sentences, when used as answers to Which novels did Jack 
read?, give rise to different implicatures: 
                                                 
14As discussed in my SALT hand-out, such a theory needs to be supplemented with a 
constraint that prevents the ‘syntactic trick’ presented in this section from being used in the case 
of negative answers, i.e. answers that use a monotone-decreasing quantifier. Without such a 
restriction, clearly unattested readings would be generated for negative answers. 
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(31) Jack read more than two novels by Balzac 
(32) Jack read three novels by Balzac 
 
 While (32) implicates that Jack read exactly three novels by Balzac (and 
no other novel), (31) suggests that the speaker does not know the exact number of 
novels by Balzac that Jack read (and that he read only novels by Balzac). Yet 
these two sentences, before pragmatic strengthening, have the same truth-
conditions: both are true if and only if Jack read at least three novels by Balzac15. 
It follows16 that an exhaustivity operator that applies globally to answers cannot 
derive different implicatures for (31) and (32). In particular, applying OpQ 
globally to (31) and (32) yields, in both cases, the contradictory proposition:  
 
(33) OpQ(Jack read more than two novels by Balzac) 
(34) OpQ(Jack read three novels by Balzac) 
 
 These two logical forms are respectively equivalent to: 
 
(35) The complete answer to Which novels did Jack read? is ‘Jack read more 
than two novels by Balzac’ 
(36) The complete answer to Which novels did Jack read? is ‘Jack read three 
novels by Balzac’ 
 
 Both (35) and (36) are plain  contradictions: the complete answer to Which 
novels did Jack read? is the proposition expressed by Jack read X, where X 
denotes the individual made up of all the novels that Jack read17. Since neither 
(35) nor (36) is equivalent to a sentence of this form, there is no world in which 
they count as the complete answer to Q. Assuming that OpQ can be inserted within 
the scope of the quantifier, the only non-contradictory way to strengthen the 
meaning of (31) and (32) is to interpret them according to the following logical 
forms: 
 
(37) [More than two novels by Balzac] [)x. OpQ (Jack read x)] 
(38) [Three novels by Balzac] [)x. OpQ (Jack read x)] 
                                                 
15I am ignoring the possibility, defended by various authors, that bare numerals are ambiguous, 
between an exactly n reading and an at least n reading. I assume that the exactly n reading is the 
result of pragmatic strengthening. 
16Unless (31) and (32) are assumed to have distinct alternatives, as in Spector (2006) and 
Russell (2006). van Rooij & Schulz (2006) note that even though (31) and (32) have the same 
truth-conditions, they are not equivalent if a richer notion of meaning is adopted, as in Dynamic 
Semantics. In DRT, for instance, (31) introduces a discourse referent associated with the condition 
‘being of cardinality greater than two’, while (32) introduces a discourse referent associated with 
the condition ‘being of cardinality exactly three’. van Rooij & Schulz’s exhaustivity operator is 
sensitive to this difference and derives the ‘exactly three’-reading only for (32). 
17As explained above, this is so both under the individual and the higher-order reading. 
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 I assume the following denotations for more than two and three: 
 
(39) [[ More than two]]   = )P<e,t>.)Q. (X (#X > 2  & P(X) = 1 & Q(X) = 1) 
(40) [[ Three]]   = )P<e,t>.)Q. (X (#X = 3  & P(X) = 1 & Q(X) = 1) 
 
 Even though more than two and three have different denotations, 
sentences of the form more than two As B and three As B are nevertheless 
equivalent as long as A and B are distributive predicates18. But this is not so if B, 
say, is not a distributive predicate. The predicate )x.OpQ (Jack read x) is precisely 
not a distributive predicate, since it can be adequately paraphrased by being all 
the novels read by Jack. If X has the property of being all the novels read by Jack, 
then no proper subpart of X can have this property. So (37) and (38) are not 
expected to be equivalent. Let us compute their truth-conditions: 
 
" (37) is true if and only if there is a plurality X of novels by Balzac whose 
cardinality is more than two and such that they are all the novels read by 
Jack. This is equivalent to ‘Jack read more than two novels by Balzac and 
did not read any other novel’, which is the desired result.  
" (38) is true if there is a plurality X of novels by Balzac whose cardinality 
is exactly three and such that they are all the novels read by Jack. This is 
equivalent to ‘Jack read exactly three novels by Balzac and did not read 
any other novel’. This is again the desired result. 
 
 
4.  Modified Numerals in Modal Contexts 
4.1.  Modified Numerals under a Necessity Modal 
 
We are now in a position to derive the contrast that was our starting point. We 
have just shown that the theory of exhaustivity presented in the previous section 
predicts that a focused DP of the form more than n NPs does not yield an exactly 
n+1 reading when it is not embedded under any operator. We now have to show 
that a sentence of the form Necessary […[more than n NPs]f…] is predicted to 
implicate Not [Necessary […[more than n+1 NPs]…]. The results of section 2 
                                                 
18That Three Ps Q entails More than two Ps Q is trivial (and true even when P or Q is not 
distributive). In the other direction, suppose that more than two Ps Q is true. Then there is a 
plurality X made up of more than two atomic individuals such that P(X) = 1 and Q(X) = 1. Let X’ 
be a part of X such that X’ is of cardinality exactly 3. Since P and Q are assumed to be distributive 
predicates (i.e. if they are true of an individual I, they are true of any part of I), X’ is a plurality 
consisting of exactly three atomic individuals such that P(X’) = 1 and Q(X’) = 1. Therefore there 
exists a plurality Y such that Y is of cardinality exactly three and P(Y) = 1 and Q(Y) = 1 (namely, 
take Y= X). Hence Three Ps Q is true. 
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will now become relevant. Let us return to the question-answer pair given in (2), 
repeated below as (41): 
 
(41) a. What books does Jack have to read in order to pass the exam? 
 b. Jack has to read [more than three novels by Balzac]F in order to pass 
the exam 
 
 The crucial point here is that (41b) CAN actually be the complete answer 
to (41a) if (41a) is understood under its higher-order reading. On this reading, 
(41a) denotes, in a given world, the set of all true propositions of the form Jack 
has to read G, with G an increasing GQ over novels. Now, in a situation in which 
Jack’s only reading obligation is to read more than three novels by Balzac, the 
strongest such proposition is precisely expressed by Jack has to read more than 
three novels by Balzac. Therefore applying the operator OpQ to (41)b as a whole 
does not result in a contradiction; rather, it yields the proposition expressed in 
(42a), which is equivalent to (42b). 
  
(42) a. ‘Jack has to read more than three novels by Balzac’ is the strongest 
true sentence of the form ‘Jack has to read G’, with G an increasing GQ 
over novels 
b. Jack has to read more than three novels by Balzac and he has no other 
reading obligation as far as novels are concerned 
 
 Now, one of the consequences of (42) is that Jack does not have to read 
more than four novels by Balzac, which is what we wanted to account for. Note 
that (42) says more than that; namely, it also asserts that Jack is free to choose 
which novels by Balzac he should read, i.e. there is no definite book by Balzac 
that he has the obligation to read; it also entails that Jack does not have to read 
any novel that is not by Balzac. This ‘freedom of choice’ effect is actually not 
predicted by Fox and Hackl’s (2006) treatment of the very same sentence when 
given as an answer to a how-many question. Combined together, my proposal and 
theirs predict a subtle but interesting contrast, depending on whether only the 
numeral or the whole DP is focused (see also Fox 2007b): 
 
(43) a. What books does Jack have to read in order to pass the exam? Jack 
only has to read [more than three novels by Balzac]F.  
 b. #… He must actually read the first four novels that Balzac wrote 
c.  #… But he also has to read a novel by Flaubert 
(44) a.  Jack only has to read more than [three]F novels by Balzac.  
 b.  … He must actually read the first four novels that Balzac wrote. 








(45) a. What novels is Jack allowed to read ? 
 b. Jack is allowed to read [more than three novels by Balzac]F 
 
  Under its higher-order reading, (45a) denotes the set of all true 
propositions of the form Jack is allowed to read G, with G a quantifier over 
novels. It turns out that in no world can (45b) be the complete answer to (45a) 
under the higher-order reading. For suppose that (45b) is true in w: this means 
that there is a world w’ that is permissible from the point view of w such that Jack 
reads more than three novels by Balzac in w’. Let X be the plurality made up of 
all novels that Jack reads in w’ (we know that X contains more than three novels 
by Balzac). Since Jack reads X in w’ and w’ is permissible in w, it is true in w 
that Jack is allowed to read X. But the proposition that Jack is allowed to read X 
therefore belongs to the denotation of (45a) in w, and is strictly stronger than 
(45b). Hence (45b) cannot the complete answer. It follows that applying OpQ to 
(45b) as whole results in the contradictory proposition. Therefore the only option 
left if we want to strengthen the meaning of (45b) is to use the syntactic trick 
described in section 3. 3, which yields the following logical form: 
 
(46)  [More than three novels by Balzac][)x. Op(45)a(Jack is allowed to read x] 
 
This corresponds to the following reading: 
 
(47) There is a group of books consisting of more than three novels by Balzac 
such that we are allowed to read this group of books and we are not 
allowed to read any other book. 
 
 So there is no way to derive the unwanted implicature (i.e., that Jack is not 
allowed to read more than four books)19. More generally, modified numerals 
within a focused DP are predicted to give rise to an implicature when the DP is 
embedded under a necessity modal, but not when it is embedded under a 




                                                 
19Clearly, we do not derive at this point the following reading, which is probably the most 
natural one for (45): ‘Jack is allowed to read any group of books consisting of more than two 
novels by Balzac, and he is not allowed to read books that are not by Balzac’. This is an instance 
of the so-called free-choice interpretation of indefinites within the scope of possibility modals. 
The derivation of free-choice effects goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
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4.  Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, I showed that the interpretation of modified numerals within 
focused DPs follows from the following assumptions:  
 
" Implicatures are derived by means of an exhaustivity operator that can be 
inserted locally, within the scope of some other expressions. 
" This operator takes two arguments, a proposition S, and a question Q, and 
returns the proposition that states that S is the complete answer to Q. The 
more sophisticated type of exhaustivity operator assumed by G&S (1984), 
van Rooij & Schulz (2004, 2006), Spector (2003, 2006) and Fox (2007a) 
can be dispensed with thanks to the first assumption. 
" Wh-questions are ambiguous between the interpretation assumed by 
Karttunen (1977) and a ‘higher-order’ interpretation; 
 
The exhaustivity operator could be defined as well as taking a proposition S and a 
set of propositions Alt(S) (a ‘focus value’ instead of a question) as its arguments, 
provided the focus value of an increasing GQ is defined as the set of all 
increasing GQs over a contextually determined set X (an assumption that receives 
support from the existence of the higher-order interpretation of wh-questions). 
 One last remark: my account is clearly a particular instance of a more 
general type of account described in Fox (2007b). Namely, the fact that certain 
expressions have a large set of alternatives is used to predict the absence of any 
implicature in non-embedded contexts or within the scope of possibility modals, 
and the presence of implicatures within the scope of necessity modals. 
References
 
Beck, Sigrid and Holtze Rullman: 1999, ‘A flexible approach to exhaustivity in 
questions’, Natural Language Semantics 7, 249-298. 
Chierchia, Gennaro: 1991, ‘Functional WH and weak crossover’, in Dawn Bates 
(ed.), Proceedings of the Tenth West Coast Conference on Formal 
Linguistics, CSLI,  Stanford. 
Engdahl, Elisabeth: 1986, Constituent questions, Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
Fox, Danny, and Martin Hackl: 2006, ‘The Universal Density of Measurement’, 
Linguistics and  Philosophy 29, 537-586. 
Fox, Danny: 1999, ‘Reconstruction, binding theory, and the interpretation of 
chains’, Linguistic Inquiry 30, 157-196. 
Fox, Danny: 2007a, ‘Free Choice Disjunction and the Theory of Scalar 
Implicatures’ in U. Sauerland and P. Stateva (eds.) Presupposition and 
Implicature in Compositional Semantics, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
298 Benjamin Spector
Fox, Danny: 2007b, ‘Too many alternatives: density, symmetry and other 
predicaments’, paper presented at SALT 17. 
Ginzburg, Jonathan: 1995a. ‘Resolving questions I’. Linguistics and Philosophy 
18, 459-527. 
Ginzburg, Jonathan: 1995b. ‘Resolving questions II’. Linguistics and Philosophy 
18, 567–609. 
Groenendijk, Jeroen. and Martin Stokhof: 1984, Studies on the semantics of 
questions and the pragmatics of answers, Doctoral Dissertation, 
University of Amsterdam. 
Karttunen, Lauri: 1977, ‘Syntax and semantics of questions’ Linguistics and 
Philosophy 1, 3-44. 
Keshet, Ezra: 2006, ‘Scalar Implicatures with Alternative Semantics’, Ms., MIT. 
Kratzer, Angelika: 2005,  ‘LSA class notes’ 
Krifka, Manfred: 1993, ‘Focus, presupposition and dynamic interpretation’, in 
Bimbò & Máté (eds.) Proceedings of the Fourth symposium on Logic and 
Language, Aron Pubslishers, Budapest. 
Kucerova, Ivona: 2007, Notes on Czech Split Constructions, Ms., MIT. 
Rooij, Robert van: 2003, ‘Questioning to resolve decision problems’, Linguistics 
and Philosophy 26, 727–763. 
Rooij, Robert van & Katrin Schulz: 2004, ‘Exhaustive interpretation of complex 
sentences’, Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 13, 491-519 
Rooij, Robert van & Katrin Schulz: 2006, ‘Pramatic Meaning and Non-
Monotonic Reasoning: the case of Exhaustive Interpretation’, Linguistic 
and Philosophy 29, 205-250. 
Russell, Benjamin: 2006, ‘Against Grammatical Computation of Scalar 
Implicatures’, Journal of Semantics 23, 361 – 382. 
Sharvit, Yael: 1999, ‘Functional relative clauses’, Linguistics and Philosophy 22,
447–478. 
Sharvit, Yael: 2002, ‘Embedded questions and ‘de dicto’ readings’, Natural 
Language Semantics 10, 97–123. 
Spector, Benjamin: 2003, ‘Scalar Implicatures: Exhaustivity and Gricean 
Resaoning’, in B. ten Cate (ed.) Proceedings of the ESSLLI’03 student 
session, Vienna.  
Spector, Benjamin : 2006, Aspects de la pragmatique des opérateurs logiques, 
Doctoral Dissertation, Université Paris 7. 
Spector, Benjamin: 2007, ‘Scalar Implicatures: Exhaustivity and Gricean 
Resaoning’, in M. Aloni et al (eds.) Questions in Dynamic Semantics, 
Current Research at the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Elsevier 
Spector, Benjamin: 2007 ‘An unnoticed reading for wh-questions: elided answers 
and weak-island effects’, Ms., Harvard University. 
Szabolcsi, Anna: 1997, ‘Background notions in lattice theory and generalized 
quantifiers’ in A. Szabolcsi (ed.) Ways of Scope Taking, Kluwer. 
Modalized Questions and Exhaustivity 299
